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Abstract in English 
In this paper, we assess the impact of financial incentives on the inflow in the public Disability 
Insurance (DI) scheme in the Netherlands. For this matter, the variation in replacement rates 
over different sectors is exploited to estimate the probability of DI enrolment over a sample of 
employees from the Dutch Income Panel (1996-2000). On the basis of these administrative 
data, we find a point estimate of the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to the DI wealth rate 
of 2.5.  
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Abstract in Dutch 
In dit paper onderzoeken we het effect van financiële prikkels voor werknemers op de kans dat 
zij instromen in de WAO. Vanwege bovenwettelijke afspraken verschillen de financiële 
voorwaarden voor deze werknemersverzekering per CAO. Koppeling van deze data aan het 
Inkomens Panel Onderzoek (1996-2000) stelt ons in staat om de elasticiteit van de 




WAO, financiële prikkels, moreel gevaar 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Summary 
The number of participants in the Dutch public disability scheme is high in comparison with 
other western countries. Several explanations exist for this. First, public disability insurance 
(DI) in the Netherlands does not distinguish between occupational risk and social risk, so that 
non-work-related disability is also covered by DI. Furthermore, all workers are fully insured 
irrespective of their work history, and partially disabled may qualify for disability benefits. A 
fourth possible explanation is the relatively high DI replacement rate. In this paper, we try to 
find out whether this last factor is a valid explanation for the relatively high use of the public 
disability scheme in the Netherlands. 
 
The financial conditions for DI vary for different employees, which is a consequence of the 
system of collective labour agreements at the firm or sector level. In this paper, we exploit this 
variation over different firms and sectors to identify the effect of financial conditions on the 
individual enrolment probability. We find that non-single female workers, older workers (aged 
50 to 60 years), and workers in the construction sector face a relatively high risk of DI 
enrolment. Younger workers (under 30 years) and workers with young children face a relatively 
low risk. Furthermore, we find that a 1% increase in the DI replacement rate implies an increase 
in the DI enrolment probability by 2.5%. Suppose for instance that the DI enrolment probability 
equals 1% and that the DI replacement rate is raised from 75% to 80% (although these figures 
are realistic they do not represent exact figures). Our results then indicate that the DI enrolment 
probability will increase to 1.17%. It should be noted that the estimated effect has been 
identified on data from the period 1996-2000. It is not unlikely that with the introduction of new 
policy measures – such as improvement of the gatekeeper system and the accomplishment of a 
system of experience rating – recent years will show a lower elasticity. 
 
In estimating our model, we try to control for the inverse causal effect: it is well possible that a 
high risk of becoming disabled implies that workers have a stronger preference for high DI 
replacement rates. With the inclusion of amongst others the lagged enrolment probabilities of 
firms or sectors we try to control for this. The model we use is the so-called ‘bounded Logit 
model’, which is capable of dealing with imperfectly observed enrolment statuses provided that 
the actual enrolment probability can be correctly specified by the Logit model. A specification 
test indeed shows that our model cannot be rejected. 
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1  Introduction
1 
In the Netherlands, as well as in many other western countries, the number of participants in 
public Disability Insurance (DI) schemes has been growing over the past three decades, which 
has led to high expenditures on such schemes and a downward pressure on labour force 
participation. Compared to other countries, the use of DI in the Netherlands is relatively high. In 
1999 the number of DI enrolments was 10.4 per 1000 insured workers, whereas enrolment in 
Germany and the United States equalled 5.3 and 6.0, respectively. In that same year, public 
expenditures on DI benefits equalled 2.7% of GDP in the Netherlands, while for Germany and 
the US expenditures equalled 1.0% and 0.7%, respectively.
2 Several possible explanations may 
exist for this difference. Unlike most other countries, DI in the Netherlands does not distinguish 
between occupational and social risks, and every worker is fully insured irrespective of his or 
her work history. Another difference is that disability is insured from a minimum of 15% of so-
called ‘earnings capacity’, implying that any worker who loses at least 15% of his/her earnings 
due to disability will be covered by DI. A fourth reason may be the relatively attractive 
financial conditions in the Netherlands (OECD, 2003). The influence of these financial 
conditions on DI enrolment is precisely the topic of this paper. 
 
DI schemes are meant to provide insurance against the risk of earnings loss due to disability. 
The growth in DI use can however not be explained by an increase of disability within the 
population (see, e.g., Aarts en de Jong, 1992). Due to informational problems and imperfect 
disability evaluation, able people may receive DI benefits instead of working more hours, or 
receive DI benefits instead of unemployment benefits, early retirement benefits, or welfare. 
Such improper use may help explaining the expansion of DI use in the Netherlands. Both 
employers and employees have experienced incentives to make use of DI in an improper way. 
Employers have often considered DI schemes as a decent way to get rid of workers with low 
productivity compared to their wages, in particular older workers. Moreover, the burden of DI 
benefits was not directly borne by the employers.
3 On the other hand, the relatively generous DI 
benefits have attracted both persons who would otherwise have worked more hours and persons 
who would have been on early retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, or welfare. In 
particular, DI is considered to be an important alternative to the ‘official’ early retirement 
schemes (Woittiez et al., 1994, Lindeboom, 1998; Kerkhofs et al., 1999). This is further 
encouraged by the fact that workers experience high implicit taxes on continued work, as DI 
benefits are not subject to any actuarial adjustments (Kapteyn and de Vos, 1999). 
 
1 The authors thank Rob Euwals, Wolter Hassink, Bas van der Klaauw, Pierre Koning, Peter Kooiman, Maarten Lindeboom, 
Rocus van Opstal, Hans Roodenburg, Jan-Maarten van Sonsbeek, Frans Suijker, and others for useful comments and 
discussions. 
2 These figures are drawn from OECD (2003). DI benefits are excluding sickness benefits, work injury benefits, and 
employment-related programs for the disabled. 
3 Note that this has changed since 1998, when experience rating was introduced in DI employer premiums. See Koning 
(2004) for an evaluation of this policy measure.   10 
A number of empirical studies have confirmed the relationship between the number of 
participants in DI schemes and the local economic situation. Among the first studies for the 
Netherlands were Van den Bosch and Petersen (1983) and Roodenburg and Wong Meeuw Hing 
(1985), who both conclude that the stock of DI-beneficiaries in the 1970s contained hidden 
unemployment. Based on the ratings of insurance physicians and ergonomists, Aarts and de 
Jong (1992) have estimated the extent to which DI-beneficiaries are able to work, and arrive at 
an implied structural share of hidden unemployment within the 1980 DI inflow of 33 to 51 
percent. Estimates of Westerhout (1996) suggest that almost 50 percent of all participants in DI 
schemes in the Netherlands in the period 1973-1992 was in fact hidden unemployment. For 
later years (1988 and 1990), Hassink et al. (1997) find a hidden unemployment rate in DI inflow 
of about 10 percent.
4 Moreover, Hassink (1996, 2000) finds that about a quarter of the 
employees enrolling into DI are not replaced by new workers, that is the concerning jobs are 
destroyed. For other countries, such as the United States, there is an abundance of literature 
showing that the local DI schemes contain hidden unemployment (see, e.g., Autor and Duggan, 
2002; Black et al., 2002). 
 
In an interesting study of Canadian DI, Gruber (2000) makes use of a policy change specific to 
the Quebec province to estimate the elasticity of labour supply of older persons with respect to 
DI benefits. His results imply point estimates of the elasticity of labour force non-participation 
with respect to DI benefits in the range 0.28-0.36. Given the fact that within his dataset the 
disabled constitute about one fifth of all non-participants, the elasticity of the probability of 
receiving DI benefits with respect to these benefits would equal about 1.6. This figure is 
actually even on the conservative side when it is thought that substitution within the category of 
non-participants is not taken into account, and that Gruber in fact identifies the short term 
elasticity (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). For the Netherlands, there is not much empirical 
evidence on the effect of financial incentives on DI enrolment. Aarts and de Jong (1992) 
estimate the probability of DI enrolment on a sample of individuals with sickness benefits, and 
find that a reduction in the replacement rate with 16 percent reduces the conditional DI 
enrolment probability by 54 percent, which implies a benefit elasticity of 3.5. 
 
This study focuses on the determinants of DI enrolment with a particular focus on the effect of 
financial incentives. By using a rich micro dataset and sector specific collective labour 
agreements, we try to identify the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to DI benefits. As a 
result of (sector- or firm-specific) collective labour agreements, benefits are usually higher than 
statutory benefits, and differ for individuals working in different sectors and firms. Therefore, 
the financial attractiveness of DI schemes differs between different sectors and firms. We 
exploit this variation in DI benefit levels to identify the effect of financial incentives on DI 
 
4 In 1987, a reform of DI took place (this will be discussed in section 2), so that the study of Westerhout (1995) mainly 
concerns the period before this reform, while the study of Hassink et al. (1997) exclusively deals with years after the reform.   11 
enrolment. Obviously, a special effort has been made to correct for unobserved sector- and 
firm-specific effects, so that the estimated elasticity will suffer the least possible from bias due 
to omitted variables. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch DI system, its history and its 
position between other forms of social security. Section 3 discusses the DI determination 
process, the determinants of DI enrolment, and the behaviour of individuals and program 
administrators making the benefit award decisions. In section 4, the data are described, while in 
section 5 our empirical strategy is presented. Estimation results are discussed in section 6. 
Finally, concluding remarks and recommendations are given in section 7. 
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2  Institutional setting 
2.1  A brief history 
The current Dutch DI system (WAO) was originally introduced in 1967, and was meant to 
provide insurance against the risk of earnings loss due to disability. During the 1970s, the 
annual growth rate of DI recipients was about 11 percent, which was much higher than expected 
at the introduction of the system. Program expenditures grew even faster, so that corrective 
policy measures were needed to alleviate the financial burden. During the 1980s various actions 
were taken, with major adjustments becoming active in 1985 and 1987. Main features of the 
reforms were the reduction of the replacement rate from 80 percent to 70 percent, introduction 
of a more equal treatment of men and women, and disconnection of the disability and 
unemployment component in the DI program by removing labour market considerations from 
disability assessment. In that same year, Unemployment Insurance (UI) was reformed as well, 
most notably by the introduction of work experience as a criterion for unemployment benefit 
duration.  
 
However, in the early 1990s it became clear that these adjustments did not lead to the expected 
volume and cost reducing effects. Thus, the second phase of reforms started. More financial 
incentives were introduced to confront both employees and employers with the financial 
consequences of the excessive use of sickness and disability benefits. In 1992, a premium 
differentiation system for sickness benefits and a (not long-lived) no-claim bonus system were 
introduced (TAV). The system implied that employers had to pay a penalty for each one of their 
employees entering the DI rolls. On the other hand, a firm employing a DI beneficiary for at 
least one year received a bonus.  
   
Until 1993, a fully disabled beneficiary received a wage-related benefit (70 percent) of 
unlimited duration. Since 1993, both the duration of the wage-related benefit and the level of 
the benefit have depended on the recipient’s age and employment history at the moment of DI 
enrolment. Depending on the age and work history, a fully disabled beneficiary receives a 
wage-related benefit (70 percent) for at most six years. During the subsequent period, a fully 
disabled beneficiary has received a base amount of 70 percent of the minimum wage plus a 
supplement depending on age. Partially disabled receive pro rata benefits. However, the 
difference between the new and old replacement rates has been repaired in practice for about 80 
percent of the employees through collective labour agreements made by the social partners 
(Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands, 2002). This will be further discussed in 
section 4.1. 
   14 
A restricted own risk for employers for sickness benefits was introduced in 1994 (TZ) in order 
to reduce absence through illness. Large firms became responsible for the continued payment of 
wages during the first six weeks of sickness, and small firms for the first two weeks. Since 1996 
employers must pay sickness benefits during the entire first year (WULBZ). The no-claim 
bonus system introduced in 1992 was lifted again in 1995 and replaced by a system of 
experience rating (PEMBA) in 1998. Furthermore firms could decide to opt out of the public 
system to bear the risk themselves or to reinsure the risk with private insurance companies.  
 
More recent policies during the late 1990s and early 2000s are aimed at achieving a more 
efficient administration. This has resulted in the merger of five different administrative offices 
into one public monopoly which is responsible for the administration of all DI and UI benefits 
in the Netherlands. This is not to say, however, that no further reforms will be made. Based on 
proposals of the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (2002), it is likely that the DI 
system will be split into two parts: a public insurance for the fully and long-lasting disabled and 
a private insurance for the temporarily disabled and partially disabled. 
2.2  The current position of Disability Insurance in the Netherlands 
Social security in the Netherlands can be divided into employee insurance and national 
insurance. The first covers risks related to labour market status, such as unemployment, 
sickness, and disability, and is mostly earnings-related. The insured population consists of those 
who are employed. The second kind of insurance is meant to provide a minimum income 
guarantee for all inhabitants of the Netherlands. The most obvious examples of national 
insurance are welfare and old age state pension.
5 Further examples are disability insurance for 
non-working younger persons (WAJONG), health care insurance (AWBZ), family allowances 
(AKW), and surviving relatives' pension (ANW). All national insurance programs are financed 
on a pay-as-you-go basis.  
 
Sickness benefits are paid to employees who are unable to work due to sickness. In principle, 
the gross replacement rate equals 70 percent of the previously earned (gross) wage, but as a 
result of collective labour agreements these sickness benefits are often supplemented up to a 
replacement rate of 100 percent. Sickness benefits may last for a maximum of 12 months.
6 At 
the end of this period, one may apply for disability benefits. Disability benefits can be granted 
to persons who would face a loss in income of more than 15 percent as a result of disability.
7 
This (estimated) loss in income is often called the degree of disability, and determines the exact 
 
5 Note that apart from the old age state pension (AOW), most persons older than 65 years are entitled to occupational 
pensions, which are mostly earnings-related. 
6 Since 2004, the period with sickness benefits has been extended to 24 months. 
7 Note the contrast with many other countries (e.g. Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom), where the loss in work capacity is 
decisive for receiving DI benefits, not the loss in income.   15 
amount of DI benefits that will be received. Both the cause of disability and the employment 
history are not relevant for the acceptance decision.  
Obviously, DI applicants are for a large part individuals who have simply become incapable to 
work. The reason for this incapability is irrelevant, i.e. no distinction has been made between 
‘professional risk’ and ‘social risk’.
8 The decision to apply for DI benefits might however also 
be related to economic incentives, and hence act as a substitute for Unemployment Insurance 
(UI), early retirement benefits, and welfare. The frequency of DI enrolment depends on DI 
program characteristics, labour market factors and alternative social security program 
opportunities. Several studies have shown that arrangements such as early retirement, DI, and 
UI act as a system of substitute pathways. Restricting one of the social security arrangements 
will therefore affect the use of the other arrangements. Limiting the conditions for early 
retirement, for example, may hardly reduce the withdrawal of elderly of the labour market, as 
they will start using alternative exit routes instead (viz. DI and UI). DI benefits are often 
perceived to be more attractive than UI benefits. First, DI does not impose a job search 
requirement. Moreover, UI benefits are of limited duration, while the only temporal aspect of 
DI entitlement is a periodical re-examination. Improper use of DI benefits as a more generous, 
and less stigmatising,
9 alternative to unemployment benefits was quite common in the late 
1970s and 1980s. It provided employers with a flexible instrument to reduce the labour force at 
will and kept official unemployment rates low (Aarts and de Jong, 1992). Several studies for the 
Netherlands have shown that the share of hidden unemployment within DI schemes lies 
between 10 and 50 percent.
10 Research for the United States shows similar results. Accounting 
for the role of disability in inducing labour force exit among the low-skilled unemployed, Autor 
and Duggan (2002) estimated that the US unemployment rate would be two-thirds of a 
percentage point higher were it not for the liberalised DI system.  
 
 
8 Note that this is not in accordance with DI in most other western countries, who do make a distinction between both types 
of risk. 
9 Woittiez et al. (1994) show that, holding other factors constant, early retirement benefits and DI benefits are the preferred 
exit routes from the labour market, while UI benefits are subject to a certain ‘stigma effect’. 
10 See the references cited in section 1.   16   17 
3  Disability Insurance benefits and individual behaviour 
Three months before finishing the period on sickness benefits, an individual may apply for DI 
benefits. Subsequently, the Dutch Social Benefits Administration (UWV
11) decides on the 
application. A medical examiner verifies and evaluates (physical) limitations and job 
opportunities, and, based on this examination, the DI administrator decides whether or not to 
accept the applicant. In case of acceptance, a benefit is awarded for a period of five years, after 
which a periodical re-examination takes place. The degree of disability is determined by an 
expert, who compares the applicant’s current earnings capacity with his past earnings capacity. 
A rejected applicant has the opportunity to appeal. The letter of objection must be sent within 
the period mentioned in the rejection letter. Subsequently, the DI administrator reconsiders the 
first decision. The application – award – appeal decision is illustrated in figure 3.1. Note that if 
an applicant is denied benefits at the reconsideration stage, then he may exercise the option to 
have his case considered by court. This is not shown in figure 3.1. 






apply do not apply
Award Decision No Benefits
accept reject
Individual: Benefits Appeal Decision
appeal do not appeal
No Benefits UWV: Reconsideration
Decision
accept reject
Benefits No Benefits  
a
 ‘Benefits’ may either be ‘full benefits’ or ‘partial benefits’ (the latter in case of partial disability). 
DI, as well as other employee insurances, suffer from the problem of moral hazard (see, e.g., 
Barr, 1993). Imperfect information of the DI administrator in the award and reconsideration 
decisions leads to higher DI enrolment as a result of an adjustment in the behaviour of the 
insured population. A second form of moral hazard may be a lack in prevention efforts. In this 
respect, the DI application and appeal decisions of an individual can be regarded as choices 
 
11 There used to exist five different administration offices, which merged into UWV in 2000.   18 
between consumption and leisure, given institutions, health conditions, personal characteristics, 
working conditions and the expected probability of being granted DI benefits.
12 Obviously, for 
many applicants this labour supply decision will be severely constrained by their health status. 
These individuals will show high demand for leisure irrespective of the financial conditions 
involved. Nonetheless, the moral hazard problem just described, together with existing 
empirical evidence (mainly for countries outside the Netherlands), suggests that factors other 
than health play a significant role in the behaviour of individuals, in particular financial 
incentives (see section 1). Thus, individuals who are less constrained by their health status are 
likely to be sensitive to financial incentives, and raise their demand for leisure as it becomes 
cheaper (that is: as the DI replacement rate becomes higher). 
 
 
12 Note that the problem of moral hazard equally applies to the employer’s behaviour (Aarts en de Jong, 1992; Koning, 
2004). This is however beyond the scope of this paper.   19 
4  Data 
4.1  Replacement rates 
As was already mentioned in section 2, the exact DI benefit conditions are the result of 
negotiations by employers’ organisations and trade unions. These negotiations, which mostly 
take place at the sector or firm level, are laid down in collective labour agreements. In the 
period that will be under consideration, the negotiated collective labour agreements at the sector 
level were made compulsory by the government for all firms in that sector. The resulting 
variation in replacement rates over different sectors and firms is exactly the variation we will 
exploit to identify the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to the financial incentives 
involved. The pitfalls involved in this approach will be discussed in later sections. 
 
A database with information on replacement rates for different sectors is available through the 
Netherlands’ Labour Inspectorate. We have made a selection of sectors, such that we were able 
to match their codes with the sector codes in our data set of individuals. This is necessary in 
order to be able to connect both data sets and perform an analysis at the micro level (this will be 
further discussed in section 4.2). The resulting selection of sectors, with corresponding 
replacement rates, is given in table A.1 (see Appendix A). The reported financial indicators are 
the replacement rate for year t (denoted by RRt), and the DI wealth rate (DIWR). This latter 
variable is defined as the ratio of the sum of all discounted future DI benefits to current income. 
This definition allows us to conveniently rewrite this indicator in terms of replacement rates RRt 
in year t:
13 































where y0 denotes current income, ρ is a constant discount factor, and RR3 is the replacement rate 
in the third year and years ahead (i.e. the replacement rate remains constant from the third year 
on). 
 
It can be seen that the average replacement rate in the first year equals 89 percent of the last 
earned wage, while the second and third year show average replacement rates of 75 and 70 
percent, respectively. Thus, the additional benefits on top of the ‘official replacement rate’ of 70 
percent are especially high in the first year of disability. As was noted in section 2.1, the 1993 
reform implied that the earnings related benefits became of limited duration, but that this loss in 
benefits was ‘repaired’ in most cases. In table A.1 it becomes clear that nearly all sectors 
 
13 Note that next to this definition we will also employ an alternative definition of the DI Wealth Rate later on in the empirical 
section, where t will be bounded by the official retirement age of 65.   20 
supplement DI benefits from the third year on to 70 percent of the last earned wage. Two 
sectors even have a higher replacement rate for these years of respectively 75 percent (joinery 
works) and 80 percent (road transport). Most of the variation in replacement rates over different 
sectors is however in the first and second year. The range of replacement rates in both years is 
from 70 to 100 percent. The variation in DIWR is however equally affected by the variation in 




































+ + = DIWR  
where σi denotes the sample standard deviation of RRi and σij denotes the sample covariance 
between RRi and RRj. The term in front of  2
3 s  inflates the contribution of the variation in RR3 
to DIWR. It turns out that at the discount factor of 0.9, loosely stated, about one third of the 
variation in DIWR is caused by variation in RR1, one third is caused by variation in RR2, and 
one third is caused by variation in RR3. At this discount factor level, the ‘DI wealth’ is seen to 
equal 7.3 year salaries, with a minimum of 7 year salaries (6 different sectors) and a maximum 
of 8 year salaries (road transport). A lower discount factor will however result in a lower weight 
of RR3 in DI wealth, and generally in lower DI wealth. 
4.2  Micro data 
The Dutch Income Panel dataset “IPO” is based on administrative data from the Dutch National 
Tax Office and was initiated in 1984.
14 Since 1989, the dataset consists of a panel of about 
75,000 individuals, who are randomly drawn from the Dutch population provided that they 
were 15 years or older and enlisted in the Dutch municipal registers. Attrition occurs only as a 
result of emigration or death. In that case new individuals are added to the sample to keep the 
total number of individuals at the same level. For each individual drawn into the sample several 
variables are available, which can be divided into three groups: 
 
￿  Variables concerning individual characteristics, such as gender, date of birth, and a variable 
indicating the sector in which the individual was working; 
￿  Variables concerning household characteristics, such as the number of persons in the 
household, the number of minor children (age categories) and marital status;  
￿  Financial variables, such as the level of the income, and the source of the income (e.g. wage 
income, pension benefit, DI benefit, UI benefit). The observation of these variables is in 
principle on a yearly basis, and relates both to household and individual income. Also, some 
 
14 The acronym IPO stands for “Income Panel Study” (in Dutch: Inkomens Panel Onderzoek).   21 
other financial variables are available, such as outstanding mortgage and real estate appraisal 
(the so-called “WOZ-value”). 
 
The IPO dataset not only contains information on the individuals selected into the sample, but 
also on the other persons in the households they belong to. These last individuals will also be 
included in our sample. A great advantage of this dataset is that the observed variables are 
measured with high accuracy. A drawback of the IPO dataset is however that it lacks some 
crucial variables which are not related to the household and financial situation of individuals, 
most notably education and health status. 
 
For our empirical analysis we use data from the period 1996-2000. We select those individuals 
into our sample who are eligible for receiving DI benefits in case of disability. That is, all 
individuals with positive wage income on December 31 of the years 1995 until 1999 are 
selected into our sample. These are precisely the individuals who might enter DI in the 
subsequent years. Thus, according to our definition, an individual enters the DI scheme when he 
receives wage income at the beginning of the year (formally, on the last day of the previous 
year) and receives a DI benefit at some other moment of the year. Note that, as a result of this 
selection process, the self-employed are also removed from our sample. This is correct, as the 
self-employed have their own Disability Insurance, which is different from the DI for 
employees considered in this paper. 
 
In order to assess the effect of financial incentives on the probability of entering the DI scheme, 
the replacement rates of the Dutch Labour Inspectorate are linked to the individuals in the IPO 
dataset. For this we use the variable in the dataset that indicates the sector in which an 
individual is working. An overview of the replacement rates of sectors used in this chapter was 
given in table 4.1. Since no substantial changes in replacement rates have occurred in the period 
1996-2002, we have linked these figures to the individuals in the IPO dataset for the period 
1996-2000. Note that the incomplete observation of replacement rates at the individual level 
implies that we are able to select only about 10% of the individuals into our sample. 
 
The resulting dataset is the core file we use for the empirical analysis. It is an unbalanced 
dataset with 97950 observations (including multiple observations per individual) during the 
period 1996 - 2000. Within this period 448 of the 97950 observations enter the DI scheme 
(0.46%). Note that the actual macro figures concerning DI inflow are higher: over the period 
concerned the average macro DI enrolment figure was 1.2% (Lisv, various years). For a part 
this can be explained from the fact that our sample is not representative for the entire Dutch 
population. For instance, the sample does not include the social service sector and the public 
sector. For another part it follows from the fact that we have multiple observations per person. 
The observed inflow percentage however still remains low. The frequencies of some important   22 
groups in the sample are presented in table 4.2, together with their DI enrolment (%). This table 
shows that 26% of the individuals in the dataset consist of women, of which 0.52% enter the DI 
scheme during the period 1996-2000. Older individuals have a higher DI enrolment during this 
period than younger individuals. The household characteristics indicate that couples have a 
higher DI enrolment than singles. Households with children have a lower DI enrolment than 
households without children. The construction sector shows a higher DI enrolment figure than 
other sectors.  
Table 4.1  Sample characteristics IPO, 1996-2000 
  In sample (% of sample size)  Disability enrolment (% of concerning category) 
     
Total  100.0  0.46 
Woman  26.1  0.52 
Man  73.9  0.44 
Age, until 29  28.6  0.16 
Age, 30 to 34  13.3  0.42 
Age, 35 to 39  14.8  0.43 
Age, 40 to 44  14.1  0.56 
Age, 45 to 49  12.9  0.60 
Age, 50 to 54  10.2  0.73 
Age, 55 to 59  5.0  1.12 
Age, above 60  1.2  0.62 
Couple  73.5  0.54 
Single  26.5  0.23 
With children  53.3  0.39 
No children  46.7  0.54 
Manufacturing sector  26.9  0.38 
Construction sector  26.3  0.59 
Trade and Food sector  33.6  0.39 
Transport and Storage sector  13.3  0.50 
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5  Empirical strategy 
As was discussed in section 3, DI program participation results from two contingencies: the 
probability that a worker claims to be disabled and applies for DI benefits, and the probability 
that the claim will be awarded by the program administrator. In most previous research the 
typical approach has been to estimate a single reduced form model of the final allowance 
decision. The main reason for this is the lack of data needed to identify the parameters which 
govern the separate stages of the process. Our analysis will be no exception to this line of 
research. In contrast, a number of studies were able to estimate a multistage model describing 
the various stages of the application and award decision (e.g. Lahiri et al., 1995; Riphahn and 
Kreider, 1998; Benitez-Silva et al., 1999).  
 
In the previous section it appeared that the observed inflow probabilities in the IPO sample are 
substantially lower than the aggregate figures (see table 4.2). This could be the result of 
incomplete observation of DI enrolment, since the administrations of the National Tax Office 
and the DI Administration Office are separate. In this section we discuss a strategy which is 
robust to this problem, provided that the underlying process is correctly specified by the Logit 
model. Two types of incomplete observation are distinguished. First, it may be the case that 
individuals entering DI somehow disappear from the sample before it is indicated that they 
actually receive DI benefits. Second, it may be the case that individuals entering DI remain in 
the sample but have their status misreported. That is, they are being characterised as working 
while they are on (partial) DI benefits. In the econometric literature, the first case is known as 
endogenous selection, while the second is known as misclassification. In the following, we label 
these as incomplete observation of type I and type II, respectively. In addition, we specify the 
log-likelihood for our sample subject to the bounded Logit model, and briefly discuss the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test in the context of this model. 
5.1  Incomplete observation 
Define Y as the variable indicating whether DI enrolment takes place (Y=1) or not (Y=0), and 
suppose that this event can be modelled through the well-known Logit model: 
(5.1) ,
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where the vector x contains a range of explanatory variables, including a full set of sector-
specific dummy variables (or alternatively, a constant and a set of sector-specific dummy 
variables related to a ‘reference sector’). Under certain regularity conditions, Maximum 
Likelihood estimation based on (5.1) will produce consistent and efficient estimates of the   24 
parameter vector β (see, e.g., Cramer, 2003). One of these regularity conditions is that 
observations in the sample are randomly selected from the population. However, in case some 
of the observations with Y=1 have somehow disappeared from the sample this condition is 
violated. That is, observations with Y=1 are endogenously selected into the sample. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that  
(i)  Y is correctly specified by the Logit model 
(ii)  Y may be incompletely observed (type I) 
Then maximisation of the likelihood based on the Logit model produces consistent and efficient 
estimates for all coefficients β in the Logit model, except for the sector-specific dummies (and 
the intercept, if included). 
 
First, consider the general case where sample selection occurs with the same probability in 
every sector. Denote with γ the probability that an observation with Y=1 is selected into the 
sample (0<γ≤1). It is well-known that in a general discrete choice model, consistent parameter 
estimates can be obtained through maximisation of the likelihood based on
15 










where p0=1-p1. In the literature, this procedure is often called ‘pseudo-likelihood estimation’ or 
‘pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation’. Now with the Logit model in (5.1) it can be readily 
checked that 
(5.3)    .
) ln ' exp( 1









This familiar property implies that estimation of the binary Logit model on an endogenous 
sample will produce consistent and efficient parameter estimates, provided that a constant term 
is included in the vector x. The ‘true value’ for β0 can only be retrieved if γ is known 
beforehand. The asymptotic standard error of this coefficient also needs a simple adjustment 
(see, e.g., Scott and Wild, 1997). Generalisation of this result to the case where the endogenous 
selection rule differs by sector is straightforward. Suppose that the probability that an individual 
entering DI is included in the sample equals γj for sector j. Equation (5.3) then becomes: 
(5.4)    .
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15 See Hsieh et al. (1985). The case considered here is the binary discrete choice model with endogenous selection on one 
outcome, but the result equally applies to multinomial discrete choice models with multiple selection rules for different 
outcomes of Y.   25 
The implication is that Maximum Likelihood estimation will again produce consistent and 
efficient parameter estimates provided that a full set of sector specific dummy variables is 
included. Similar to the case with the ‘general’ selection rule in (5.3), consistent estimators for 
these dummy variables can only be retrieved if the factors γj are known, while asymptotic 
standard errors for these dummy variables need to be adjusted. We now turn to the more general 
case, where both incomplete observation of type I and type II may be present. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that  
(i)  Y is correctly specified by the Logit model 
(ii)  Y may be incompletely observed (type I and/or type II) 
Then maximisation of the likelihood based on the bounded Logit model produces consistent and 
efficient estimates of all coefficients β in the Logit model, except the sector-specific dummies 
(and the intercept, if included). 
 
Suppose that a fraction of the observations not having “Y=1” is incorrectly observed, that is
16 
(5.5)    } 1 | 0 Pr{ = = = Z Y p  
is greater than zero. Here the observed binary variable is denoted by Y, while the true score is 
denoted by Z. Now if we assume the Logit model – either with or without endogenous selection 
on “Y=1” (equations (5.1) and (5.4), respectively) – then the probability of observing DI 
enrolment equals 
(5.6)    ). 1 ( ) 1 }( 0 | 0 Pr{ } 1 | 0 Pr{ 1 } 1 Pr{ 1 1 1 1 p - = - = = + = = - = = = q q Z Y q Z Y Y r  
Hence, the probability of observing “Y=1” equals 
(5.7)    .
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This model is identical to the so-called ‘bounded Logit model’ (see, e.g., Cramer, 2004). Note 
that the specification is derived under the assumption that misspecification chronologically 
follows endogenous selection (type II follows type I). If this schedule is reversed, then the 




16 See Hausman et al. (1998) for a more general treatment of the topic. 
17 The concerning model is (5.4) with the argument x’β+ln(γj) replaced by x’β+ln(γj)+ln(1-π).   26 
5.2  Estimation and testing 
Our likelihood is based on (5.7), and writes as: 




- - + =
n
i
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where observations are indexed by i, the total number of observations in the sample is n, and yi 
indicates DI enrolment for observation i. In (5.9) the coefficients γj are suppressed, as these 
cannot be identified separately from the firm-specific dummy variables contained in β. Each 
observation corresponds to an individual in a specific year, so that we may have multiple 
observations for a given individual. The inclusion of individual specific effects into our model 
is however not an attractive option, as it involves both theoretical and practical problems. First, 
it is well-known that Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation with the individual fixed effects as 
parameters alongside β causes the estimates of the latter to be inconsistent.
18 A second, more 
practical problem, is that this involves the addition of a vast number of parameters (in our case 
over 30,000!). The alternative approach, which overcomes these two problems, uses ΣiœA(i,j) yi as 
a sufficient statistic for the fixed effect of individual j and consistently estimates β from the 
likelihood conditional on this sufficient statistic (A(i,j) denotes the set of observations {i} which 
correspond to individual j). This approach is however also problematic because it implies that 
the model is only identified from the ‘within’ dimension of the data, which in our case means 
that only the individuals entering DI contribute to the likelihood, while others (99,5% of our 
data) are discarded. A second problem with this alternative approach is that no ‘average partial 
effects’ or elasticities can be computed, as the fixed effects distribution remains unknown. The 
second alternative to pooled estimation, the inclusion of random effects, is also not very 
attractive as it involves the rarely satisfied assumption that these random effects are 
uncorrelated with the covariates in x. In fact, in a recent Monte Carlo study Greene (2003) finds 
that random effects estimation is inferior to both fixed effects and pooled estimation.
19 His 
results further suggest that the pooled estimator performs better if the number of observations 
per individual (i.e. the number of elements in A(i,j)) is small, while the fixed effects estimator 
(full estimation) does relatively better if the number of observations per individual increases. 
For our case, this is another argument in favour of the pooled model, as the number of 
observations per individual is at most 4. 
 
Theoretically, the ML estimate of β not only is inconsistent in the random effects and fixed 
effects (full estimation) model, but also in the pooled model. In particular, the latter will lead to 
attenuated estimates of β (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 470-472). However, Greene’s Monte 
 
18 See Lancaster (2000) for a survey on this ‘incidental parameters problem’. 
19 For this matter, the author has presented results for the Probit model, but these are likely to carry over to the Logit model.   27 
Carlo results suggest that this attenuation bias might be small – in particular for continuous 
covariates. Moreover, our concern is primarily with the elasticity of r1 with respect to variables 
xj (in particular DIWR), which is less sensitive for the neglect of unobserved heterogeneity than 
the parameters in β; see Appendix B. 
 
In the discussion of the previous subsection it has become clear that the assumption of the Logit 
specification is crucial for our analysis. It is therefore necessary to test this assumption. For 
instance, we can test whether the predicted fraction with Y=1 in the sample is consistent with 
the shape of the (bounded) Logit curve. Suppose that the observations are ordered into G 
different groups by their predicted probabilities r1(i) for individual i, i.e.: 
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for all g=2, ..., G, and I(g) is the set of individuals in group g. Denote with ng the number of 
observations in group g, with fg the fraction of observations in this group with Y=1, and with 
r1(g) the average predicted probability of Y=1 for this group. Under the null hypothesis that the 
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has a chi-square distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1980; 
2000). When small probabilities are involved, Cramer (2003, 2004) advocates the use of groups 
with equal numbers of observations. The point is that if the composition of the groups is based 
on percentiles of r1, then the sample population will be extremely unevenly distributed across 
different groups, so that the test loses much of its power. 
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6  Estimation results 
The estimation results for both the Logit and the bounded Logit model are shown in table 6.1. 
While the bound in the latter model is significantly different from one at a 5% confidence level, 
it can be seen that the point estimates of all other parameters are hardly different from those in 
the Logit model. The most important difference concerns the (asymptotic) confidence intervals 
which become somewhat wider in the bounded Logit model. As a consequence, the asymptotic 
t-test for the hypothesis that a parameter equals zero shows diverging results for a few variables. 
The score in the bounded Logit model is somewhat better than in the Logit model, though not 
convincingly so. 
 
The specification includes both the lagged DI enrolment per sector as well as dummy variables 
for each (broadly defined) sector, in an attempt to correct for sector-specific effects. Lagged DI 
enrolment is determined over the same sectors as the DI Wealth Rate (see Appendix A), but can 
be identified separately from the latter as it varies more over different sectors.
20 This variable is 
likely to be a good first predictor for the individual enrolment probability, and indeed the 
concerning estimate is close to unity. Furthermore, the significantly positive dummy variable 
for the Construction sector suggests that, after controlling for individual, household and 
financial variables, the individual risk of DI enrolment is higher in that sector than in the others. 
This seems plausible, as the work in this sector is in general physically more demanding. 
However, if incomplete observation of type I (endogenous selection) plays a role here, then 
both the magnitude and the asymptotic t-statistic for the “Construction” sector are biased 
downward, so that the estimate may even be on the conservative side.
21 
 
As was apparent in (4.1), the DI Wealth Rate nonlinearly depends on the discount factor ρ. It 
turned out to be difficult numerically to find the optimal value for this parameter, so that we 
have repeatedly estimated both models for fixed values of ρ and finally reported those estimates 
for which the log-Likelihood attained its maximum value. For both the Logit and the bounded 
Logit model the optimal value for ρ was 0.79, implying an individual discount rate of 21%.
22 
The estimation results are however rather insensitive for (local) variations in ρ. The point 
estimate for the DI Wealth Rate parameter equals 0.70 and 0.71 for the Logit and the bounded 
Logit model, respectively, which translates into an elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to the 
DI Wealth Rate of 2.5 (in both models). The coefficient of 0.71 in the bounded Logit model 
implies a marginal effect of 3.25·10
-3. Thus, our model predicts that a constant replacement rate 
 
20 In fact, the correlation between both variables (over the sample of individuals) amounts no more than 0.11. 
21 See subsection 5.1, and Scott and Wild (1997) for technical details. 
22 This grid search was performed over the set {0.700; 0.705; 0.710; ...; 1.000}.   30 




The other parameter values mostly show their expected signs. The risk of DI enrolment tends to 
become higher for higher ages. The exception is the age category of 60 to 64, which shows a 
lower risk than the two younger categories. This can be attributed to the relatively high 
relevance of the ‘competing risks’ of unemployment and (official) early retirement. A second 
explanation is that we have only few observations in this age category (i.e. few individuals 
having paid work; see table 4.2), so that small sample bias may play a role. For women, it is 
seen that living together with a partner increases the risk of DI enrolment, while for men there 
does not appear to be an effect. On the other hand, having young children appears to have a 
negative impact on the propensity to DI enrolment. There is no obvious explanation for this. 
Perhaps parents have a larger incentive to earn sufficient income in order to satisfy the needs of 
their children.  
 
23 A constant replacement rate of 70% and 75% respectively implies a DIWR of 333.33 and 357.14 (both computed at the 
discount rate of 21%). Hence, the estimated effect on the enrolment probability equals (3.25·10
-3)·(357.14-333.33)=17%.   31 
Table 6.1  Model estimates, asymptotic standard errors between parentheses, n=97950 
       Logit model  Bounded Logit model 
         
Log-Likelihood  - 2719.60      - 2719.58     
         
Constant  - 9.04**    (1.23)  - 8.66**    (1.50) 
         
Financial variables         
DI Wealth Rate  0.70**    (0.33)  0.71*    (0.40) 
Lagged Income  - 0.09**    (0.03)  - 0.09**    (0.03) 
         
Lagged DI enrolment in sector
a  1.11**    (0.18)  1.11**    (0.23) 
         
Age category
b         
30-34  1.23**    (0.23)  1.23**    (0.28) 
35-39  1.30**    (0.23)  1.30**    (0.28) 
40-44  1.39**    (0.23)  1.39**    (0.28) 
45-49  1.30**    (0.23)  1.30**    (0.28) 
50-54  1.50**    (0.23)  1.50**    (0.28) 
55-59  1.94**    (0.24)  1.95**    (0.29) 
60-64  1.38**    (0.43)  1.39**    (0.52) 
         
Household situation
b         
Female/single  - 0.52      (0.34)  - 0.52      (0.42) 
Female/with partner  0.41**    (0.21)  0.41      (0.25) 
Male/with partner  0.16      (0.20)  0.16      (0.24) 
         
Children in household
b         
Younger than 6 years  - 0.74**    (0.18)  - 0.74**    (0.22) 
6 to 12 years  - 0.37**    (0.16)  - 0.37*    (0.20) 
12 years or older  - 0.14      (0.14)  - 0.14      (0.17) 
         
Sector
b         
Manufacturing  - 0.09      (0.16)  -0.09      (0.20) 
Construction  0.55**    (0.18)  0.55**    (0.22) 
Trade and food  0.04      (0.17)  0.04      (0.20) 
         
Year
b         
1997  - 0.31**    (0.14)  - 0.31*     (0.17) 
1998  - 0.34**    (0.14)  - 0.35**    (0.17) 
1999  - 0.72**    (0.16)  - 0.73**    (0.19) 
2000  - 0.60**    (0.14)  - 0.60**    (0.18) 
         
Bound  1               -  0.67**    (0.06) 
Discount rate  0.21           -  0.21         - 
         
Implied elasticity
c  2.50**    (1.17)  2.50*     (1.42) 
         
* Significantly different from zero at 10% confidence level (asymptotic t-test). 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% confidence level (asymptotic t-test). For the variable “Bound” the relevant hypothesis is whether 
its coefficient is equal to one. As can be seen, the asymptotic t-test soundly rejects this hypothesis. 
  a
 This variable is defined as the average DI enrolment over the period 1993-1995 for the sector the individual is working in, and is 
computed on the basis of our sample. 
b
 The reference categories for these dummy variables are: “younger than 30 years of age”, “male/single”, “no children”, “Transport and 
Storage”, and “1996”, respectively. 
c
 Asymptotic standard errors have been computed with the Delta method. 
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Results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test are shown in table 6.2 and figure 6.1, with group sizes 
equalling 9794 or 9795. The resulting test statistic equals 13.1, which is lower than the 5% 
critical value of 15.5. Thus, the bounded Logit model cannot be rejected. The last two columns 
in table 6.2, and figure 6.1, indeed show that the ‘curvature’ of the predicted probabilities 
indeed does not deviate too much from the postulated curvature of the bounded Logit model. 
Note that on the basis of this statistical test the plain Logit model can also not be rejected, with 
a test statistic equalling 11.8 at the same critical value as above. 
Table 6.2  Hosmer-Lemeshow test (with equal group sizes) of the bounded Logit model 
Number of observations in 
interval 
Lower bound (%)  Upper bound (%)  Average predicted 
probability of DI 
enrolment (%) 
Observed fraction of 
DI enrolment (%) 
         
9794  0.00  0.10  0.10  0.07 
9795  0.10  0.15  0.08  0.12 
9795  0.15  0.21  0.13  0.18 
9795  0.21  0.27  0.28  0.24 
9795  0.27  0.34  0.38  0.30 
9795  0.34  0.43  0.34  0.39 
9795  0.43  0.55  0.38  0.49 
9795  0.55  0.70  0.60  0.62 
9795  0.70  0.95  0.97  0.81 
9795  0.95  6.13  1.32  1.36 
 




















observed predicted  
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In Table 6.3, estimation results for alternative specifications are reported. Variants 1 and 2 are 
the ‘extreme cases’ of incomplete observation, the first with exclusively type I (endogenous 
selection) present and the second with exclusively type II (misspecification). The elasticity 
estimate appears quite robust, as both ‘extremes’ remain quite close to the basic estimate. 
Variants 3-6, a lower discount rate and alternative sector-specific enrolment variables, imply 
somewhat higher elasticity estimates, but lower likelihoods.  
Table 6.3  Sensitivity analysis 
Specification  Likelihood  Bound  Implied elasticity with respect to DIWR
a 
       
0. Basic
b  - 2719.58  0.67  2.50 (1.42) 
1. Bound equal to 1
b  - 2719.60  1  2.50 (1.17) 
2. Bound equal to 0.46/1.2
c  - 2719.66  0.38
c  2.59 (1.89) 
3. Discount rate = 10% (ρ=0.9)  - 2720.02  0.50  3.17 (2.54) 
4. DIWR with cut-off at age 65
d  - 2720.14  0.68  3.21 (1.77) 
5. Lagged variable = Enrolment in past year  - 2725.58  0.68  3.82 (1.41) 
6. Lagged variable = Average enrolment in 
past three years 
- 2728.75  0.82  3.75 (1.27) 
  a
 Asymptotic standard errors are reported between parentheses. 
b
 These specifications correspond to those reported in table 6.1. 
c
 In this variant, the bound in the bounded Logit model is fixed at a value equal to the sample average probability of DI enrolment divided 
by the actual (macro) probability of DI enrolment. The latter has been computed as an average over all relevant years (also see section 
4.2). 
d
 In this variant, the DI Wealth Rate was summed over the time periods 1 until T, where T equals the number of years until the official 
retirement age 65. That is, the new formula for DIWR simply follows from replacing ∞ by T in (4.1). The reported results correspond with 
a discount rate of 14%, which turned out to be optimal with this definition of DIWR. 
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7  Conclusion and directions for further research 
In this paper, we have estimated the impact of the financial conditions in Disability Insurance 
(DI) on the individual’s probability of DI enrolment. We have found that individuals with 
relatively high DI Wealth (that is, the ratio of foreseen DI benefits to current income) are more 
likely to enrol. Based on variation in DI replacement rates between different sectors, the 
concerning elasticity was estimated at a value of 2.5. In estimating this elasticity, we have 
controlled for individual and household specific characteristics, and have tried to correct for 
sector specific effects (other than financial conditions) and the possibility of incomplete 
observation of DI enrolment.  
 
A possible problem we have not been able to address is that DI replacement rates may in the 
long term depend on the risk of DI enrolment. That is, labour unions have a stronger incentive 
to negotiate high replacement rates if the risk of DI enrolment is higher. If this is really the case, 
then our estimated elasticity may overestimate the true effect. Taking account of such a 
mechanism will however prove difficult, as no appropriate instruments
24 appear to be available. 
A second point which is left for future research is that the current elasticity has been estimated 
at given eligibility criteria. It is however likely that the elasticity depends (negatively) on 
eligibility strictness, so that the evaluation of policy measures including a modification in 
eligibility criteria would require more precise knowledge of this interdependence. 
 
   
 
24 That is, variables influencing the replacement rate, but not DI enrolment. A possibility is  to estimate a simultaneous model 
for DI enrolment and the DI replacement rates, but this would require data over a longer time period. The problem with such 
a long time period is data inconsistency; e.g. the definitions of sectors have changed (in 1993), and the composition of 
sectors has also changed over the years.   36   37 
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Appendix A.   Replacement rates per sector 
Table A.1  Overview of replacement rates of sector collective labour agreements, 2002 
Sector Code 
a  Category 
b  Name  RR1 
c  RR2  RR3  DIWR 
d 
             










170  1  Manufacture of textiles  100  70  70  730 
182  1  Manufacture of wearing apparel and 









203  1  Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery  80  75  75  755 
212  1  Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard  100  100  70  757 
222  1  Printing and service activities related to printing  100  100  70  757 






























280  1  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 









342  1  Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor 










361  1  Manufacture of furniture  80  70  70  710 
400  1  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  90  70  70  720 
452  2  Building of complete constructions or parts 









453  2  Building installation  100  70  70  730 
454  2  Building completion  70  70  70  700 
501  3  Sale of motor vehicles  100  70  70  730 
513  3  Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco 









513  3  Wholesale of meat and meat products  100  70  70  730 
514  3  Wholesale of textiles  100  70  70  730 
514  3  Wholesale of electrical household appliances 
and radio and television goods 
100  70  70  730 
521  3  Retail sale in non-specialised stores (excl. 














522  3  Retail sale of meat and meat products  90  70  70  720 
523  3  Dispensing chemists  81.25  70  70  711.25 
523  3  Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic goods  90  80  70  729 
524  3  Retail sale of hardware, paints, glass, books, 









524  3  Retail sale of household appliances and radio 









524  3  Retail sale of clothing  70  70  70  700 
524  3  Retail sale of footwear and leather goods  70  70  70  700 
524  3  Retail sale of textiles  90  70  70  720   42 
 
Table A.2           Overview of replacement rates of sector collective labour agreements, 2002, continued 
             










550  3  Hotels and restaurants  100  90  70  748 










555  3  Canteens and catering  100  90  70  748 
601  4  Transport via railways  90  80  70  729 
602  4  Freight transport by road  80  80  80  800 










602  4  Taxi operation  80  70  70  710 
640  4  Post and courier activities  85  70  70  715 
                
    Sample mean  89  75  70  727 
    Standard deviation  11    8.7    1.8  20 
              a
 Sector codes are according to the so-called ‘SBI 1993’ definition. Note, that we have only reported the 3-digit codes here, while some 
sectors are actually defined on the basis of 4-digit codes. 
b 
Sectors are divided into the following categories: 1 = Manufacturing, 2 = Construction, 3 = Trade and food, 4 = Transport and storage. 
c
 Replacement rates for year t are denoted by RRt. The replacement rate for the third year remains constant for later years, i.e.: 
RR3=RR4=RR5=… 
d 
The DI wealth rate (as a percentage of current income) reported in this column is calculated at a discount rate of 10 percent, i.e. ρ=0.9. 
             
Source: Labour Inspectorate 
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Appendix B.   Parameters and implied elasticities:  
      consistent estimation 
In a general discrete choice model with probability of success r1, the elasticity of r1 with respect 










for some given individual. A consistent point estimate of the elasticity with respect to xj is then 
equal to the average of the individual elasticities.
25  
 
The question is now: suppose that the process should instead be represented by a specification 
r1c with some heterogeneity correction term c, would (B.1) then be correct still? In this case, the 
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where c is a vector which is randomly distributed across the population, and Ec denotes the 
expected value operator with respect to c. Thus, (B.1) is consistent if (and only if) 
(B.3)  .























This is a mild condition compared to those needed for consistent estimation of the parameter βj. 
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satisfy (B.3). The conclusion is that individual behaviour not necessarily needs to obey a 
relatively rigid model specification in order to generate consistent estimates for elasticities, as 
long as the ‘average behaviour’ is in accordance with the ‘rigid specification’. A well-known 
example is the computation of ‘average partial effects’ (APE’s) in the random effects Probit 
 
25 The standard error of this elasticity can be computed with the well-known Delta method.    44 
model (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 470-472). If the random effects are ignored, that is if the 
Probit model is estimated on the pooled data, then the ML estimates for β are biased towards 
zero, but the implied APE’s are still consistent. However, such a general result cannot be 
derived for the bounded Logit model, but just illustrates the point we want to make here. 
 